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I. INTRODUCTION
At the outset, I should make my bias "perfectly clear": I am an un-
abashed supporter of the Federal Rules of Evidence. That is not to
say that the Federal Rules contain no inconsistencies, ambiguities, or
dysfunctional aspects. At present, however, they represent the best
available effort to define a set of basic rationales for the admissibility
of evidence and to establish rules that are consistent with those ratio-
nales. By focusing on the extent to which admission or exclusion
would better serve the enunciated rationales, the Rules attempt to
avoid decisions as to the admissibility of evidence based on semantic
disagreements. In addition, there are good reasons for adopting a
code of evidence, regardless of its substantive merit, because of the
relatively greater predictability, uniformity, and opportunity for care-
ful analysis under codified rules than under case-by-case decisions.'
This article discusses the underlying reasons for establishing rules
of evidence, defines two unavoidable conflicts encountered in at-
tempting to effectuate the purposes for adopting such rules, suggests
that the Federal Rules of Evidence help resolve these conflicts by ad-
hering to several clearly enunciated rationales, and, finally, indicates
how the Rules recognize and accommodate important new scientific
and social insights on the admissibility of evidence.
In formulating the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Advisory Com-
mittee, 2 the United States Supreme Court, and Congress in many in-
I. Except to the extent that these reasons affect the substantive bases for the Rules,
they are outside the scope of this article. For example, predictability is achieved both by
establishing a written code and by establishing individual rules defined to encourage
more uniform and hence more predictable application by judges. It is the latter aspect
of predictability which this article will address.
2. Appointed by the United States Supreme Court and composed of judges. practi-
tioners and law professors, the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence published the
original draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence in March 1969. The proposed rules were
then subjected to extensive debate and amendment in both houses of Congress and the
United States Judicial Conference. They were signed into law on January 2, 1975, and
became effective on July I, 1975. For a more detailed account of the progress of the
Federal Rules through the various committees which considered them, see I J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE at vii-xi (1977) [hereinafter cited as WEIN-
STEIN].
Several states (for example, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wisconsin) adopted the pro-
posed rules with relatively few changes, while they were being considered by the Su-
preme Court and Congress. At least 13 states (Arkansas, Florida, Maine, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, and Wisconsin) adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence with various
modifications, and several other states (for example, Michigan and Colorado) are cur-
rently considering adoption with modifications. Id. at T- I to T-2 (Supp.); 3 FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE NEWS 78-85 (1978).
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stances had to choose between two possible rules either of which
would have effectuated the policies analyzed in this article,3 or which
involved conflict between two or more valid policy considerations. 4
This article does not attempt to evaluate such value judgments.
II. THE NEED FOR (ANY) RULES OF EVIDENCE
Although it is not entirely beyond dispute, the assumption that
there is a need to establish rules governing the admissibility of evi-
dence in civil and criminal trials has come to be accepted as a fact of
legal life. The original reasons for not permitting the trier of fact to
consider all evidence5 either party chooses to present are often ig-
nored. Yet it is only by identifying those rationales that the validity of
a particular rule providing for the admission or exclusion of evidence
can be determined.
The three primary bases for the establishment of rules of evidence
are practicality, distrust of juries, and need for acceptance by the liti-
gants and the public of court decisions. Practicality requires some
3. For example, treating like things alike is a valid purpose of an evidence code. See
text accompanying notes 104-12 infra. To the extent that present sense impressions
are demonstrated to be as trustworthy as excited utterances, either the addition of a pre-
sent sense impression exception to the hearsay rule or the deletion of the excited utter-
ance exception would equally serve that purpose.
4. For example, the Advisory Committee proposed that the declarations against in-
terest exception to the hearsay rule include declarations against "social interest":
statements which so far tended "to make [the declarant] an object of hatred, ridicule, or
disgrace, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement un-
less he believed it to be true." H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in
[ 19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7089. Congress disagreed and eliminated
statements against "social interest" from the exception. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). De-
ciding whether to adopt a declaration against social interest exception to the hearsay
rule required balancing the policy of treating like things alike against the policy of
avoiding waste of time and jury confusion.
Fear of social disgrace often will be greater than fear of loss of a small amount of
money. Indeed, people may be willing to pay a blackmailer large sums of money rather
than have embarrassing facts made public. See United States v. Dovico, 261 F. Supp.
862, 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 325 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 944
(1967). Thus, statements genuinely against social interest are as reliable as statements
against pecuniary or proprietary interests and should be treated similarly.
Nevertheless, the difficulty in determining which embarrassing statements are suffi-
ciently against interest to be reliable is much greater than similar determinations con-
cerning statements against pecuniary, proprietary, or penal interests which are usually
quantifiable. Id. at 874. Therefore, the danger of misleading the jury or wasting a great
amount of time on preliminary admissibility questions, see FED. R. EVID. 104(a), is also
greater. Whichever rule eventually was adopted, then, would promote at least some of
the values discussed in this article.
5. For this purpose, "evidence" must mean anything presented to the senses of the
trier of fact, without regard to its eventual admissibility or weight.
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limitation on the admissibility of evidence. Even if it would be ratio-
nal to permit consideration of anything and everything in determining
the outcome of a particular dispute, it would be impossible on a prac-
tical level. Otherwise, some cases would never be concluded and
many would be excruciatingly lengthy and costly.6 The rules concern-
ing relevancy, 7 methods of proving character, 8 and self-authentica-
tion9 effectuate this rationale.
In addition to serving practical necessity, rules of evidence attempt
to prevent avoidable confusion, unfair prejudice, and extraneous con-
siderations that may cause the trier of fact to decide on an improper
basis.10  Although judges are not immune to such improper
influences, 1 the rationale is often seen as expressing a distrust of ju-
ries. 12 Federal Rule 40313 in particular, but also Rules 404,14
6. Practical experience indicates that, for some reason, many lawyers do not con-
sider a concise presentation to the trier of fact to be in their own self-interest. Indeed.
obfuscation can be a potent weapon on behalf of a party with a weak case on the merits.
7. FED. R. EvID. 401, 403. Rule 403 provides, "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id. 403.
8. FED. R. EvID. 405, 608, 609. Under the Federal Rules, "evidence of truthful char-
acter is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been at-
tacked." Id. 608(a)(2). In explaining this provision, the Advisory Committee noted that
"It] he enormous needless consumption of time which a contrary practice would entail
justifies the limitation." Id. 608, Advisory Comm. Note, Subdivision (a).
9. FED. R. EvID. 902. The accompanying Advisory Committee's Note indicates that
"practical considerations reduce the possibility of unauthenticity to a very small dimen-
sion." Id. Advisory Comm. Note.
10. Such rules are promulgated because the rulemaker believes that just results are
more likely to be attained by using general rules of evidence (whether common law or
codified) to admit or exclude evidence than by admitting all evidence offered. The
rulemaker, not the jury, decides what evidence would constitute a proper basis for de-
ciding a particular case.
11. In one case the defendant's conviction was reversed because the trial judge had
examined the defendant's criminal record during trial and commented, "'You can tell
more what kind of a snake you are dealing with if you can see his color.' " United States
v. Hamrick, 293 F.2d 468, 469 (4th Cir. 1961). In another case the Supreme Court re-
versed the defendant's conviction because, in instructing the jury, the trial judge had
said, " 'You may have noticed ... that [the defendant] wiped his hands during his testi-
mony. It is a rather curious thing, but that is almost always an indication of lying .... I
think that every single word that man said, except when he agreed with the government's
testimony, was a lie.' "Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 468 (1933).
12. The primary fear is that juries may fail to understand the misleading nature of
offered evidence, but there is also the possibility that they may refuse to give effect to
policies with which they disagree.
13. Rule 403 provides, "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury .... " FED. R. EVID. 403.
14. Rule 404 provides, with certain exceptions, as follows:
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.
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410,15 411,16 and 60917 promote this rationale. Although it is usually
assumed that juries are able to ignore or give minimal weight to un-
helpful or misleading evidence when given a limiting instruction,18
certain categories of evidence are believed to be so prejudicial that the
jury could not possibly give them the minimal weight they deserve.
Finally, since trials serve to promote values in addition to truth,19
including orderly and fair dispute resolution, rules of evidence ensure
... Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the charac-
ter of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.
FED. R. EVID. 404. In explaining the limitation on character evidence, the Advisory
Committee quoted from the California Law Revision Commission, Report, Recom-
mendations & Studies 615 (1964):
"Character evidence is of slight probative value and may be very prejudicial. It
tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened
on the particular occasion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good
man and to punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite what
the evidence in the case shows actually happened."
Id. Advisory Comm. Note, Subdivision (a).
15. Rule 410 provides, "[E vidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of
nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere ... is not admissible
in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer." FED.
R. EvID. 410.
16. Rule 411 provides, "Evidence that a person was or was not insured against lia-
bility is not admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrong-
fully." Id. 411. The Advisory Committee's Note states that the most important basis for
the rule is "the feeling that knowledge of the presence or absence of liability insurance
would induce juries to decide cases on improper grounds." Id. 411, Advisory Comm.
Note. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 201 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972).
17. Rule 609 provides that evidence of conviction of a crime can be used to im-
peach a.witness only if the crime "(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in ex-
cess of one year... and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or
false statement." FED. R. EvID. 609(a). "[I] f a period of more than ten years has elapsed
since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement im-
posed for that conviction, whichever is the later date," the conviction is not admissible
"unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the
conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect." Id. 609(b).
18. E.g., id. 105 (evidence admissible for one purpose but not for another purpose
may be admitted with a limiting instruction). The Advisory Committee's Note explains:
In Bruton v. United States, 389 U.S. 818, 88 S.Ct. 126, 19 L.Ed.2d 70 (1968) [sic],
the Court ruled that a limiting instruction did not effectively protect the accused
against the prejudicial effect of admitting in evidence the confession of a codefen-
dant which implicated him. The decision does not, however, bar the use of limited
admissibility with an instruction where the risk of prejudice is less serious.
Id. Advisory Comm. Note. The citation to Bruton provided by the Advisory Committee
is to the memorandum grant of certiorari. The opinion of the Court appears at 391 U.S.
123 (1968).
19. See Aronson, Professional Responsibility: Education and Enforcement, 51
WASH. L. REV. 273, 297 (1976); Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1482 (1966);
Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 10
(1975).
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that these additional values will not be ignored in deciding individual
cases. Henry Hart and John McNaughton have stated:
In judging the law's handling of its task of fact-finding in this set-
ting, it is necessary always to bear in mind that this is a last-ditch
process in which something more is at stake than the truth only of the
specific matter in contest. There is at stake also that confidence of the
public generally in the impartiality and fairness of public settlement of
disputes which is essential if the ditch is to be held and the settlements
accepted peaceably.20
Therefore, even in those instances when it would be rational to trust
the trier of fact to ignore irrelevant or improper evidence, exclusion-
ary rules help to convince the litigants that the merits of the dispute
have been fairly tried. For example, even if it would be reasonable to
allow the trier of fact to give whatever weight was proper to hearsay
evidence, rules which admit only the most reliable hearsay tend to
make trials appear fairer, thereby increasing respect for the legal sys-
tem.2
1
In addition, some rules of evidence promote values extrinsic to the
particular dispute involved. Such values include the desirability of
taking subsequent remedial measures, 22 attempting to compromise
disputed claims, 23 obtaining liability insurance,24 establishing certain
confidential relationships, 25 and discouraging police misconduct. 26
Many recently adopted rules of evidence are intended in part to pro-
mote the smooth and efficient operation of business enterprises by
20. Hart & McNaughton, Some Aspects of Evidence and Inference in the Law. in
EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 53 (1958) (the Hayden Colloquium on Scientific Concept
and Method) (emphasis in original).
21. That is not to say that litigants today believe the rules of evidence ensure fair-
ness. A frequent criticism of the legal system is its proliferation of rules. resulting in vic-
tory for the attorney who can best manipulate them. Nonetheless, one of the original
purposes of the rules was to reassure the parties that misleading and unfairly prejudicial
evidence would not be a factor in the ultimate decision. To the extent that the rules of
evidence fail in effectuating this goal, the rules need to be modified, not eliminated alto-
gether.
22. FED. R. EVID. 407 and accompanying Advisory Comm. Note.
23. Id. 408 and accompanying Advisory Comm. Note.
24. Id. 411.
25. Rule 501 provides that "privilege ... shall be determined in accordance with
State law." Id. 501. Washington has established privileges protecting, among others, the
following relationships: attorney-client, WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(2) (1976). physi-
cian-patient, id. § 5.60.060(4), psychologist-patient, id. § 18.83.110, and clergy-peni-
tent, id. § 5.60.060(3).
26. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
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recognizing the necessity of certain business practices to the economy.
These rules include the business records exception to the hearsay
rule,27 expanded admissibility of photocopies, computer printouts and
electronic re-recordings, 28 and self-authentication of trade inscrip-
tions,29 commercial paper,30 and certified copies of public records. 31
III. TWO UNAVOIDABLE CONFLICTS IN
EFFECTUATING THE RATIONALES
SUPPORTING RULES OF EVIDENCE
In determining what an evidence code should contain in order to
best effectuate the rationales enunciated above, it is useful to con-
sciously analyze two fundamental concepts: formal versus nonformal
decisionmaking and faith in versus fear of juries.
A. Formal Versus Nonformal Decisionmaking
One concept inherent in all decisionmaking has been described by
Professor William Powers as the conflict between formal and nonfor-
mal decisionmaking. 32 The former is characterized by well-defined,
easily applied rules and by strict adherence to those rules. At the risk
of oversimplification, such rules have the advantage of uniform and
consistent application, and therefore predictability and stability; they
have the disadvantage of inflexibility and inability to accommodate
either unforeseen but relevant factors or scientific and socio-psycho-
logical advances. 33 Nonformal decisionmaking, often appearing in le-
27. FED. R. Ev[D. 803(6)-(7).
28. Id. 1001(3)-(4); 1003. Computer printouts present not only best evidence prob-
lems but also hearsay problems. The term "original" is defined to include computer
printouts, thus resolving the best evidence problems in favor of admissibility. Id.
1001(3). The Advisory Committee's Note explains that "practicality and usage confer
the status of original upon any computer printout." Id. 1001, Advisory Comm. Note,
Paragraph (3). The hearsay problems have increasingly been resolved in favor of admis-
sibility using either the business records exception, see King v. State, 222 So. 2d 393,
398 (Miss. 1969), or some other mechanism, see Roberts, A Practitioner's Primer on
Computer-Generated Evidence, 41 U. CHi. L. REV. 254, 272-74 (1974).
29. FED. R. EvID. 902(7).
30. Id. 902(9).
3 1. Id. 902(4).
32. Powers, Formalism and Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology, 52
WAsH. L. REV. 27, 28-37 (1976). See also Erlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258 (1974).
33. Professor Powers describes formal decisionmaking as follows:
Formal decisions derive both their benefits and detriments from their rigidity
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gal decisions as a balancing test, permits the consideration of all rele-
vant factors in each case, and thereby avoids unjust results due to the
inflexibility of strictly applied rules. Nonformal decisionmaking,
however, is time-consuming, subject to the biases of the judge in each
case, and therefore less consistent or predictable. 34
An example of this conflict and a recurring problem in the law of
evidence is the definition and application of the hearsay rule.35 Some
out-of-court statements are so unreliable that they should not be con-
sidered by the trier of fact; other statements, although made out of
court, are reliable and helpful to the trier of fact. A strict rule, either
admitting or excluding all hearsay, would be predictable and easy to
apply and would promote uniform application. Admission of all hear-
say, however, would undermine the three rationales for establishing
rules of evidence: unreliable and prejudicial statements would mislead
or confuse the jury, would cause lengthy and costly trials, and would
often cause the litigants to believe the ultimate jury determination to
be improper and unfair. 36 Exclusion of all hearsay, on the other hand,
and exclusion of relevant information. They (1) are likely to be predictable, facili-
tating private planning and reducing litigation, (2) are easier to apply because the
limited scope of information is more manageable, (3) help shift responsibility from
decisionmakers to rulemakers, (4) help rulemakers transmit their values by con-
trolling decisionmakers who might not be trusted, (5) help advance certain formal
elements of justice by making it more likely that like cases are decided alike, and
(6) promote liberty in the sense of freedom from arbitrary power and the predilec-
tions of decisionmakers. Of course, this is not an exhaustive outline of the benefits
of formal rules, but it is important to note that an argument in favor of formal
rules is complex and multifaceted. It is tempting to attack a formal rule by sup-
porting it with one justification (commonly predictability) and then demonstrating
that the rule has not obtained its goal. While such a demonstration reduces the
strength of the argument for formal rules, the argument is negated only if all justifi-
cations of formality are overcome.
Powers, supra note 32, at 29-30 (footnotes omitted).
34. This conflict between strictly applied rules and discretionary balancing occurs
primarily in two ways with respect to the application of evidence rules. First, the rules
of evidence may be determined on a case-by-case basis by appellate courts, or a code of
evidence such as the Federal Rules of Evidence may be adopted, leaving only matters of
interpretation to the courts. Second, regardless of the manner of establishing the rules.
they either may be strictly defined or may give the trial judge discretion concerning ad-
missibility.
35. Rule 801 defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the mat-
ter asserted." FED. R. EvID. 80 1(c).
36. Awareness of the injustice that could arise from the admission of all hearsay was
particularly occasioned by the result in Rex v. Raleigh, 2 Cob. St. Tr. 1 (1603). In that
case, Sir Walter Raleigh was convicted of high treason on the basis of the hearsay
statements of Lord Cobham who was never produced at trial and who purportedly had
first confessed to the crime (implicating Raleigh as a co-conspirator), retracted his con-
fession, and then retracted his retraction. Phillimore wrote, "Thus, on the single evi-
dence of Cobham, never confronted with Raleigh. ... did an English jury, to the amaze-
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might reduce the length of the trial37 and avoid jury confusion,38 but
would not create respect for the decision by litigants (or for the legal
system by the public) if the excluded hearsay were considered impor-
tant and trustworthy. 39
An alternative approach to the problem, and the one adopted by
the majority of jurisdictions, is to exclude all hearsay except that
which fits into several narrowly defined exceptions. However, as an
increasing number of hearsay statements appeared to be both reliable
and important to the proper resolution of particular cases, the excep-
tions threatened to swallow the rule. Dean McCormick suggested that
the hearsay rule simply provide, "'Hearsay is inadmissible except
where the judge in his discretion finds it needed and trustworthy.' "40
This suggestion clearly raised the conflict between formal and nonfor-
mal decisionmaking in the hearsay area.41
ment and horror of the bystanders, and the perpetual disgrace of the English name, find
the most illustrious of their fellow subjects guilty of high treason." J. PHILLIMORE,
HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 157 (1850), reprinted in D.
LOUISELL, J. KAPLAN, & J. WALTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 89 (3d ed. 1976).
37. This result is not so clear. Assuming that the information contained in the out-
of-court statement was important to the offering party, exclusion would require a more
elaborate method of getting the evidence before the jury. Apparently the business rec-
ords exception to the hearsay rule was adopted primarily for this reason. In explaining
the history of the Federal Rule concerning business records, FED. R. EvID. 803(6), the
Advisory Committee noted, 'These reform efforts... concentrated considerable atten-
tion upon relaxing the requirement of producing as witnesses, or accounting for the
nonproduction of, all participants in the process of gathering, transmitting, and record-
ing information which the common law had evolved as a burdensome and crippling as-
pect of using records of this type." Id. 803, Advisory Comm. Note, Exception (6).
38. But note that in those instances where an alternate, more elaborate means of in-
troducing the evidence contained in the hearsay statement must be employed, see note
37 supra, the possibility of jury confusion would likely be increased.
39. E.g., 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1078 at 166 n.2 (Chadbourne rev. 1972). Wig-
more discusses Rankin v. Brockton Public Market, 257 Mass. 6, 153 N.E. 97 (1926) in
which the plaintiff, a customer in a store, had been hit on the head. The court excluded
the saleslady's admission that she had tossed the item of store equipment which had
struck the plaintiff because the saleslady had no authority to bind the defendant
storeowner. "[Y] et she had authority to sell goods and make a profit for defendant; then
why not an authority to say how she sold them? Such quibbles bring the law justly into
contempt with laymen." 4 J. WIGMORE, supra § 1078 at 166 n.2.
40. McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE LJ. 489, 504 (1930). See
also Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331 (1961); Comment,
Elimination of the Agency Fiction in the Vicarious Admissions Exception, 54 WASH. L.
REV. 97 (1978) (this volume).
41. This conflict was repeated when Congress considered whether to adopt a resid-
ual hearsay exception and what form such an exception should take. The result is the fol-
lowing exception which appears in both Rule 803 and Rule 804:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule .. .
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court deter-
mines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
Washington Law Review Vol. 54:31, 1978
Specifically enumerated, clearly defined, and strictly applied hear-
say exceptions have all the advantages of formal rules suggested by
Professor Powers. 42 They permit individuals and businesses to plan
activities and keep records based on the clear predictability of their
admissibility. Predictable rules also permit attorneys to prepare ade-
quately for trial.43 Application of clearly defined hearsay exceptions
should be easier than weighing the trustworthiness and the need for
each out-of-court statement. The "bright line" provided by specifi-
cally enumerated exceptions gives appellate judges the means (other
than the nebulous "abuse of discretion") to review trial court evidenti-
ary rulings. This result is particularly important since, regardless of
the quality of trial court decisions under ideal conditions, hearsay rul-
ings are usually made "in the heat of the battle," with little opportu-
nity to reflect upon the bases and purposes for the hearsay rule and its
exceptions.
Narrowly defined and applied hearsay exceptions, however, also
possess the defects of formal rules.44 Their easy application is occa-
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evi-
dence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the gen-
eral purposes of these rules and the interests ofiustice will best be served by admis-
sion of the statement into evidence.
FED. R. EviD. 803(24) (similar language in 804(b)(5)). The Advisory Committee
originally provided for more wide-ranging discretion. In its proposed draft, the Com-
mittee included an exception which would have given a trial court power to admit evi-
dence which, though not covered by any of the other exceptions, displayed "comparable
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
5, reprinted in [ 1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7079.
In its review of the Rules, the House Judiciary Committee rejected the wide discre-
tion offered by the residual exception and deleted it from the Rules because it injected
"too much uncertainty into the law of evidence and impair[ed] the ability of
practitioners to prepare for trial." Id. If new hearsay exceptions were to be created,
"they should be by amendments to the Rules, not on a case-by-case basis." Id.
The Senate Judiciary Committee, on the other hand, feared that without the residual
exception, the rigidity of the specific exceptions in the face of trustworthy but techni-
cally inadmissible hearsay evidence would cause
the specifically enumerated exceptions [to be] tortured beyond any reasonable cir-
cumstances which they were intended to include (even if broadly construed).
Moreover, these exceptions, while they reflect the most typical and well recognized
exceptions to the hearsay rule, may not encompass every situation in which the reli-
ability and appropriateness of a particular piece of hearsay evidence make clear
that it should be heard and considered by the trier of fact.
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7051, 7065. See generally Imwinkelried, The Scope ofithe Residual Hearsay Ex-
ceptions in the Federal Rides of Evidence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 239 (1978).
42. See note 33 supra.
43. For example, a prosecutor seeking a dying declaration from the victim of an as-
sault can ensure eventual admissibility only if the prerequisites are clearly defined and
understood.
44. See Powers, supra note 32, at 30-32. Professor Powers discusses these defects
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sionally at the expense of considerations relevant to the particular
case but not anticipated by the drafters of the rule. A rule that in the
vast majority of cases will best effectuate the policies deemed most
important may least promote those policies in an individual case. A
particular out-of-court statement may be trustworthy and needed yet
not fall within any of the formal exceptions, or a particular statement
may not be trustworthy and needed yet fall within an exception. Also,
it is the nature of formal rules that the language of the rules, rather
than the policies underlying them, dictates their application in indi-
vidual cases. For example, if the declaration against interest exception
to the hearsay rule does not provide for admission of a declaration
against penal interest,45 such a declaration will be excluded, even if
the rationales behind admitting statements against pecuniary interest
apply with greater force to a particular statement against penal inter-
est.46
as "mapping" and "freezing" problems. The former "occurs because rules do not always
translate (map) perfectly the policies which generated them into results in individual
cases." Id. (footnote omitted). For example, if the primary defects of hearsay statements
are that they possess great potential for insincerity, faulty memory, and faulty percep-
tion on the part of the declarant because not subject to oath, cross-examination, or ob-
servation of demeanor by the trier of fact, the hearsay exceptions are believed to pro-
vide substitutes for the oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor which
make the statements sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact. FED. R.
EvID., art. VIII, Advisory Comm. Note, Introductory Note: The Hearsay Problem.
Many recognized exceptions, however, are based on erroneous or outmoded beliefs
concerning reliability. For example, the reliability of dying declarations is certainly
open to question. See, e.g., id. 804, Advisory Comm. Note, Subdivision (b), Exception
(3); H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7075, 7089. Also, Robert Hutchins and Donald Slesinger have totally under-
mined the factual assumptions underlying the supposed reliability of excited utterances.
Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Spontaneous Excia-
mations, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432 (1928).
To the extent that these rigidly defined exceptions have improperly effectuated the ra-
tionales for admissibility, they also fail to promote the bases for establishing any rules of
evidence. Since judges must admit evidence under these unreliable exceptions (indeed
one purpose of formal rules is to restrict trial judge discretion), improper mapping
results in injustice in a certain number of cases.
A "freezing" problem occurs "when formal rules freeze the decisionmaking process
into a set of rules that reflect values of one era which are no longer held in the next."
Powers, supra note 32, at 31. In a broader sense, freezing slows the process of recogni-
tion not only of changing social values, but also increased scientific and psychological
knowledge. Examples include the slow recognition of computer-generated evidence and
advances in photocopying under the hearsay and best evidence rules, the refusal to in-
clude psychologists and psychiatric social-workers within the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, and the unavailability of a present sense impression or similar exception to
the hearsay rule.
45. See, e.g., Allen v. Dillard, 15 Wn. 2d 35, 129 P.2d 813 (1942).
46. For an extreme case, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (exclu-
sion of third-party testimony of the witness's confession because against penal, not pe-
cuniary, interest held in part responsible for depriving defendant of a fundamentally
fair trial.)
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This tension between the desirability of formal and nonformal evi-
dentiary rules exists in all cases-not just with respect to the hearsay
rule-and manifests itself on at least two levels: a code versus case-
by-case determination by appellate courts, and strictly defined rules
(whether defined by a code or by case law) versus loosely defined
guidelines and greater trial court discretion, reviewable only for abuse
thereof.47
B. Faith in Juries Versus Fear of Juries
A second conflict which must be considered before the content of a
rational evidence code can be determined is the extent to which evi-
dentiary decisions should be left to the jury. Historically, the law of
evidence has wavered schizophrenically between faith in the fairness
and reliability of the jury system and lack of faith in individual jurors'
ability to ignore misleading scientific or technical evidence48 and ap-
peals to emotion. 49 The interest in avoiding unduly long trials man-
dates that at least some evidence be kept from the jury, and some evi-
dence is unquestionably misleading. The extent to which the trial
judge should screen out evidence of questionable relevance or which
is potentially misleading or unduly prejudicial is a determination that
47. In fact, these levels and alternatives present a continuum from the least flexi-
ble-a formal code containing strict rules-to the most flexible-great trial court dis-
cretion determined on a case-by-case basis.
48. The California Supreme Court has held that the prosecution's use of the law of
probabilities "establishing" the chances of defendant's innocence to be one in twelve
million was reversible error. "Undoubtedly the jurors were unduly impressed by the
mystique of the mathematical demonstration but were unable to assess its relevancy or
value." People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 41, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497, 505
(1968). Another leading case in the area is State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894
(1962) (admissibility of polygraph evidence) (cited with approval in State v. Ross. 7 Wn.
App. 62, 68. 497 P.2d 1343, 1347, petition for review denied, 81 Wn. 2d 1003 (1972).
See also Highleyman, The Deceptive Certainty ofthe "Lie Detector," 10 HASTINGS L.
REV. 47 (1958).
49. One authority has written:
Recognizing the trial as an adversary proceeding taking place under the dramatic
conditions of emotional disturbance, with defiance, antagonism, surprise, sympa-
thy. contempt, ridicule and anger permeating the atmosphere of the entire proceed-
ing, and with members of the jury chosen from the public at large, with no required
experience in determining controversial issues of fact under such circumstances,
the courts at an early date excluded logically relevant circumstantial evidence
when the risks involved in the above policy considerations were found to be so out
of proportion to the probative value of the offered evidence as to constitute a clear
basis of exclusion.
Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385,
392 (1952) (emphasis in original).
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has caused extensive litigation in courts and debate among legal com-
mentators. It is not a question which is easily analyzed, empirically or
otherwise. Even years of experience with numerous juries is likely to
leave a practitioner or a judge with only a vague feeling of how he be-
lieves the question should be answered.50 To make matters worse,
policy considerations extrinsic to the determination of a particular
case often call for exclusion of arguably relevant evidence. 51
IV. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE-A
SIGNIFICANT STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
Resolution of the two conflicts discussed above is essential to a ra-
tional definition of relevancy, delineation of trial judge decisions as
opposed to those left to the jury, and determination of policy consid-
erations justifying exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence. The Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence represent a significant effort to resolve the
conflicts between formal versus nonformal and judge versus jury deci-
sionmaking. Some degree of conflict is resolved simply by adopting a
code-any code. It is the thesis of this article, however, that the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence have value far beyond the mere fact that they
have been incorporated into a code. Primary advances include elimi-
nation of decisions based on semantics, systematic adherence to
several clearly defined and enunciated rationales with an eye toward
the proper functioning of the law of evidence as a whole, and recogni-
tion and accommodation of advances in scientific, technical, and so-
cio-psychological knowledge.
A. Elimination of Decisions Based on Semantics
At least in part because evidence rules have traditionally developed
on a case-by-case basis in each jurisdiction, evidentiary rulings have
not been uniform, and thus have been difficult to predict. In an at-
50. For example, an instruction to the jury to disregard portions of a confession
which implicated the defendant was held to be constitutionally deficient, in part because
"the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great ... that the prac-
tical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored." Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968). The dissent believed the instruction was sufficient. "I
believe juries will disregard the portions of a codefendant's confession implicating the
defendant when so instructed." Id. at 142 (dissenting opinion) (White, J.).
51. See text accompanying notes 22-31 supra.
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tempt to avoid the ensuing confusion, many jurisdictions created nar-
rowly defined rules which were then strictly applied. This super-for-
mal decisionmaking procedure, however, often resulted in decisions
based on placing an offered piece of evidence within or without a par-
ticular category. For example, a witness's opinion was not admissible
if it went to the "ultimate issue." 52 The "ultimate issue" category was
originally intended to reflect the underlying policies for allowing only
certain kinds of lay witness opinions. But years of decisions defining
and redefining what constitutes an "ultimate issue" and determining
which testimony goes to an "ultimate issue" drew the analysis further
and further away from the policies that were the basis for the rules. In
addition, semantic debates engendered otherwise unnecessary litiga-
tion and confusion, 53 and often served merely as "a trap for the
unwary." 54
52. E.g., Warren Petroleum Co. v. Thomasson, 268 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1959) (opinion
on legal liability); Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 325, 5 N.W.2d 646
(1942) (dictum) (opinions on guilt, negligence, and reasonable cause).
53. In specifically abolishing the so-called "ultimate issue" rule, the Advisory Com-
mittee stated:
The rule was unduly restrictive, difficult of application, and generally served only
to deprive the trier of fact of useful information. 7 WIGMORE [EVIDENCE] §§ 1920.
1921 [(3d ed. 1940)]; MCCORMICK [stpra note 16] § 12. The basis usually as-
signed for the rule, to prevent the witness from "usurping the province of the jury,"
is aptly characterized as "empty rhetoric." 7 WIGMORE [stUpra] § 1920, p. 17.
FED. R. EVID. 704, Advisory Comm. Note. Weinstein discusses the unpredictability and
confusion engendered by the rule requiring testimony as to "facts" but not "opinions'
as follows:
The inability to consistently draw a line between fact and opinion led to numer-
ous appeals and reversals and a decline in the predictability of a law suit's out-
come. In the first edition of his Treatise in 1904, Wigmore declared that the opin-
ion rule "has done more than any one rule of procedure to reduce our litigation
towards a state of legalized gambling." [3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1929 at 2563
(Isted. 1904)].
3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, 1 701 [01], at 701-6 (footnotes omitted).
54. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [ 1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 7051, 7057. The Advisory Committee originally recommended that state-
ments made during compromise negotiations, as well as offers of compromise them-
selves, be inadmissible. FED. R. EVID. 408, Advisory Comm. Note. The House Judiciary
Committee, however, sought to continue the common law practice of not excluding ad-
missions of fact, even though made during settlement negotiations, unless the
statements were in hypothetical form or were prefaced with a disclaimer. H.R. REP. No.
650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075,
7081. The Senate Judiciary Committee reinstated the exclusion of statements made dur-
ing compromise negotiations, because (among other reasons) the House version, "by
protecting hypothetically phrased statements .... constituted a preference for the sophis-
ticated, and a trap for the unwary." S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted
in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7057. The Federal Rules also eliminate
the trap that caught the prosecution in People v. King, 101 Cal. App. 2d 500, 225 P.2d
950 (1950). In that case, the police had taped a conversation, recorded the original tape
onto a magnetic disc, and then erased the original tape under police department cus-
tomary procedures. The court held that the conversation recorded on the disc violated
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To the extent possible, the Federal Rules define admissibility in
terms of the rationales that support the rules, and eliminate decisions
based on semantics. For example, under Rule 704, "[t] estimony in
the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objec-
tionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the
trier of fact."'5 5 Thus, debates over what is an "ultimate issue" are
mooted. But what of the legitimate concerns that led to the original
ban on opinions concerning the ultimate issue? In a personal injury
action, can a witness now testify that the defendant was negligent, or,
in a medical malpractice action, that the doctor's conduct caused the
plaintiffs injuries? Before determining how these questions are an-
swered under the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is useful to analyze the
policy bases for excluding any opinion evidence and for not excluding
all opinion evidence. Then testimony concerning negligence or causa-
tion can be measured against the pertinent federal rule and the poli-
cies supporting it.
Briefly stated, opinions, being abstractions, are much less reliable
than observations or other sense perceptions that form the basis for
those opinions, because "with each abstraction by the witness the pos-
sibility of error increases." 56
Requiring the witness to be specific exposes flaws in his memory for
"[i] f a witness has had a hazy perception or if his recollection has
been dulled over a period of time, it would be much easier for the wit-
ness to testify in terms of inferences than to give a detailed account."57
Although thorough cross-examination can often reveal erroneous ab-
stractions, "[m] isconceptions of the witness can be exposed much
more easily by examining the raw data on which he grounded his con-
clusion than by challenging the conclusion itself."58 However, despite
the value in most cases of requiring the raw data as opposed to the
opinions or inferences drawn from that data, "[w] itnesses often find
the best evidence rule because the proponent had intentionally, although in good faith,
destroyed the original tape. Federal Rules 1001(4), 1003, and 1004 would change this
result.
55. FED. R. EVID. 704.
56. 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, 701 [01], at 701-8.
57. Id. 701 [01] at 701-8 to 701-9 (quoting Slovenko, The Opinion Rule and
Wittgenstein's Tractatits, 14 U. MIAM L. REV. 1, 19 n.61 (1959)). See C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 11 (Ist ed. 1954); M. McCormick, Opinion Evidence in Iowa, 19 DRAKE L.
REv. 245, 246 (1970).
58. 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, 701 [01], at 701-9.
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difficulty in expressing themselves in language which is not that of an
opinion or conclusion." 59
Rule 701 has attempted to effectuate the above, sometimes con-
tradictory, considerations by limiting lay opinions and inferences to
those "which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness
and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the deter-
mination of a fact in issue." 60 For example, in most cases, rationally
based 6' opinions as to speed, identity, size, weight, distance, etc.,
would be more helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony than
would be attempts to break them into more elemental sense percep-
tions.
We return, then, to the question whether opinions on negligence or
causation are admissible under the Federal Rules. A conclusion as to
negligence is the result of a combination of factual and legal determi-
nations. The legal aspects of such a conclusion would be based on the
witness's view of the law and thus would not be rationally based on
sense perceptions.6 2 Furthermore, an opinion as to negligence could
59. FED. R. EvID. 701, Advisory Comm. Note. Of course, all testimonial facts are,
in reality, opinions of varying degrees of abstraction. See MCCORMICK, supra note 16, §
11; W. KING & D. PILLINGER, OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS 3-4, 8 (1942). A commonly
cited example is identification. A witness who testifies that she saw "the defendant"
leave the scene of the accident is really summarizing a series of observations-the size
of his nose, his height, weight, eye color, and others. Attempts to force the witness to
break the identification into its elemental components would leave the witness "tongue-
tied." Rather, if there is some aspect of the identification which defense counsel desires
to question, he may do so on cross-examination. In most cases, on cross-examination
counsel will prefer to test the manner and accuracy by which the witness arrived at a
particular opinion instead of the underlying sense impression. Thus, if a witness states
that the defendant was "doing at least 65 miles per hour," cross-examination probably
should test the witness's ability to judge speed in general and explore any particular cir-
cumstances that would make the estimate in question unreliable. It would be a wasteful
and futile exercise to require the witness to state the "facts" underlying her testimony
that the speed was 65 miles per hour.
60. Fed. R. Evid. 701. The rule thus "recognizes that necessity and expedience may
dictate receiving opinion evidence, but that a factual account insofar as feasible may
further the values of the adversary system." 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, 701 [02], at
701-9.
61. "The rational connection test means only that the opinion or inference is one
which a normal person would form on the basis of the observed facts." WEINSTEIN, Sl1pra
note 2, 701 [02], at 701- 1I. Such opinions are sometimes referred to as shorthand ren-
ditions of fact. See, e.g., M. McCormick, Opinion Evidence in Iowa, 19 DRAKE L. REV.
245, 248 (1970). If a witness personally observed a speeding car or a defendant's facial
features for a sufficient length of time, an opinion as to the speed of the car or the iden-
tity of the person would be rationally based on these perceptions. See note 59 supra.
62. In the everyday meaning of the words, the testimony that the defendant was neg-
ligent or that the doctor caused the subsequent abnormal reaction would appear to be
based on sense perceptions. But if the witness thought that the defendant was negligent
because he failed to check his brakes, it is the failure to check that was based on observa-
tion; the characterization of this failure as negligent could be accomplished only after
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normally be broken down into more elemental sense perceptions of
the events in question and therefore would usually be less helpful to
the trier of fact than the underlying perceptions themselves.63 An
opinion on causation, however, is usually based on the witness's per-
ception (unless expert knowledge is required), is more difficult to
break down into elemental sense perceptions, and, assuming adequate
opportunity for cross-examination by opposing counsel to rectify any
misleading aspects, is helpful to and easily understood by the jury.64
In short, Rule 701 would rarely permit an opinion on negligence and
would more frequently permit an opinion on causation.
Under the Federal Rules approach, then, the trial judge is given
great discretion to admit or exclude a particular opinion by consider-
ing the extent to which the policies served by the rule would best be
promoted. He is no longer directed to consider semantic distinctions
between "facts," "conclusions," "opinions," and "ultimate facts." As
Judge Weinstein has aptly stated:
Basically, Rule 701 is a rule of discretion. It replaces the orthodox
rule of exclusion with a rule that requires the trial judge, on the basis
of the posture of the particular case before him, to decide whether
concreteness, abstraction or a combination of both will be most effec-
tive in enabling the jury to ascertain the truth and reach a just result.
Different judges may reach different determinations in the same situa-
tion because of diverse views on the need for concrete testimony and
the desirability of allowing parties to introduce evidence in their own
way. In construing Rule 701, however, they should bear in mind that
the aim of the rule is to eliminate time-consuming quibbles over ob-
jections that would not [a] ffect the outcome regardless of how they
were decided. The emphasis belongs on what the witness knows and
not on how he is expressing himself. 65
In a number of other areas, the Federal Rules have avoided the
instruction by the judge in order to be rationally based. Likewise, for the statement "in-
jection of the wrong serum caused the plaintiff's paralysis" to be rationally based on the
witness's perceptions, observations plus medical or legal standards must be applied.
This can be done only by a medical expert (see FED. R. EVID. 702, 703) or by the trier of
fact following detailed instruction.
63. Because it is the function of the trier of fact to apply the legal principles to the
facts, a statement that the defendant was negligent would not be as helpful as the obser-
vation that the defendant failed to check his brakes.
64. In addition, the likelihood that the jury and the witness will have widely diver-
gent views of causation is much smaller than the likelihood that they will understand the
term "negligence" differently.
65. 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, 701 (02] at 701-17.
Washington Law Review Vol. 54:31, 1978
common law use of semantic categorization by defining evidentiary
rules in terms of underlying policy bases. For example, no longer
must a proferred item of evidence be labeled a "writing" 66 and then
classified as an "original," a "duplicate," or a "duplicate original" in
order to determine its admissibility; 67 instead, the best evidence rule is
66. Objects bearing a number or inscription, such as a policeman's badge or an en-
gagement ring, have been defined as "writings." C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 199, at
411 (1st ed. 1954). Additionally, Wigmore has suggested that "it is conceivable that
upon occasion the particular features of an uninscribed chattel may be so open to mis-
construction and may become so material to the issue that it would be proper to require
production." 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 39, § 1181, at 420-21. He illustrated this state-
ment with an English case compelling production, for comparison purposes, of the
plaintiff's and the public bushel measures. Id. § 118 1, at 421 n.2.
The principle should not be carried to ridiculous extremes. In Davenport v. Ouris-
man-Mandell Chevrolet, Inc., 195 A.2d 743 (D.C. 1963), the number of miles on an au-
tomobile service sticker was in dispute. The appellate court ordered a new trial on the
ground that a witness's offer to testify to the numbers he had transcribed from the car,
which was parked outside the court, was inadmissible. Detaching the sticker would have
opened the witness to the charge that the sticker could have come from anywhere, and a
photograph would have been secondary evidence. As one authoritative source has said,
"One does not have to uproot a tombstone to prove in court the inscriptions which it
bears .... ." J. MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN, J. CHADBOURNE & J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 189 n.l (5th ed. 1965). See also 5 WEINSTEIN, supra note 2,
1001(1)[01].
67. See 64 HARV. L. REV. 1369 (1951). For an excellent summary of the develop-
ment and use of these definitions, see MCCORMICK, supra note 16, §§ 229-36. Professor
McCormick states that the basic premise justifying the requirement of introducing the
original of a writing under the best evidence rule is the great importance of the exact
wording in duplicate instruments "where a slight variation of words may mean a great
difference of rights." Id. § 23 1. See also E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 385
(1962). Because "there is substantial hazard of inaccuracy in many commonly utilized
methods [of] making copies of writings," the preference for original documents is usu-
ally justified. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 23 1. In addition, some courts and legal
commentators have pointed to the possibility of misrepresentation or fraud as an ancil-
lary justification for the rule. See, e.g., United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.
1938); 1 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE 93 (1842); Rogers, The Best Evidence Rule, 20 WIs.
L. REV. 278 (1945). And in Toho Bussan Kaisha, Ltd. v. American Pres. Lines. Ltd.,
265 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1959), the possibility that the proponents would introduce only se-
lected portions of a comprehensive set of writings to which the opposing party had no
access was cited as a basis for the rule.
Because copies or duplicates were originally transcribed by hand or letter-press, the
likelihood of error, intentional or unintentional, was great and the preference for the
original was justified. See MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 236, at 567 & n.62.
As technological advances produced first carbon copies and then photocopies, how-
ever, the pressure to admit such counterparts to the same extent as the originals resulted
in a new category-"duplicate originals," See, e.g., Parr Constr. Co. v. Pomer, 217 Md.
539, 144 A.2d 69 (1958). Since a "duplicate original" was defined so that it must be sim-
ultaneously executed, or at least intended by the parties to be equally effective as em-
bodying the transaction, see MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 235, at 567, first carbon
copies (e.g., Lockwood v. L. & L. Freight Lines, 126 Fla. 474, 171 So. 236 (1936)), and
then photostatic copies (e.g., Cox v. State, 93 Ga. App. 533, 92 S.E.2d 260 (1956), were
held to be secondary evidence, inadmissible unless the original was lost or destroyed.
Although the effort to admit reliable copies to the same extent as the originals was natu-
ral and desirable, basing the determination regarding admissibility on semantic distinc-
tions between the various categories engendered confusion and decisions unrelated to
the purposes of the best evidence rule.
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defined in terms of its purposes. Although the distinction between
originals and duplicates is maintained,6 8 duplicates are admissible to
the same extent as originals unless the rationales for preferring the
original (possibility of intentional or unintentional mistranscription69)
exist, i.e., "(1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the
original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the du-
plicate in lieu of the original." 70 Furthermore, the confusing and in-
ternally contradictory "duplicate original" has been eliminated. 71 The
best evidence rule, like the opinion rule, must be applied under the
Federal Rules with a view toward rationales rather than strictly de-
fined common law categories.72
B. Enunciation of Primary Policy Rationales for Determining Close
Cases
The Federal Rules represent a code in its best sense. Formerly, evi-
dentiary decisions concerning hearsay or relevancy were made with-
out regard to the resolution of privilege or opinion issues. If some
consistent, unifying principle did develop, it was usually by accident.
In drafting the Federal Rules, the Advisory Committee chose to treat
68. The Federal Rules provide:
(3) Original. An "original" of a writing or recording is the writing or recording
itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or
issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes the negative or any print there-
from. If data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other out-
put readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an "original".(4) Duplicate. A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same impression
as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including en-
largements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by
chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately repro-
duces the original.
FED. R. EVID. 1001(3)-(4). The definition of duplicate also eliminates most debates
over what is or is not a duplicate. It allows "any type of reproduction, made regardless
of purpose, to be labelled a duplicate so long as it is produced by a technique designed
to insure an accurate reproduction of the original." 5 WEINSTEIN, supra note 2,
1001(4)[02), at 1001-76.
69. See note 67 supra.
70. FED. R. EvID. 1003.
71. See MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 235,at 567 n.58.
72. A similar result has been dictated by elimination of the term "res gestae." Em-
ployed as a catch-all, permitting introduction of hearsay evidence without an applicable
exception and also without any clearly defined standards or uniform application, res
gestae has been held to apply at different times to the following hearsay exceptions now
embodied in the Federal Rules: present sense impressions, FED. R. EvID. 803(1); excited
utterances, id. 803(2); declarations of mental, emotional, or physical condition, id.
803(3). See MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 288; Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-
1945, 59 HARV. L. REv. 481, 586 (1946). It has also been applied to some nonhearsay,
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the law of evidence as a whole by giving primacy to several specific
rationales and policies. The result is beneficial to both judges and at-
torneys because these basic principles may be applied to resolve close
issues whenever they arise under the Federal Rules. Resort to basic
principles leads to more uniform and predictable decisions within
each area of evidence (for example, hearsay, opinion, authenticity),
and evidentiary decisions in one area are rendered more consistent
with decisions in other areas. In this section, four of these basic prin-
ciples will be identified and briefly analyzed. 73
1. "All relevant evidence is admissible, except
A provision for excluding irrelevant evidence is "a presupposition
involved in the very conception of a rational system of evidence, '74
and Federal Rule 402 provides, in part, that "[e] vidence which is not
relevant is not admissible. ' 75 Rule 402, however, also clearly indi-
cates that once testimony or a document is determined to be relevant,
the burden is on the party opposed to its admission to demonstrate
that a limiting rule or countervailing policy considerations nonethe-
less dictate exclusion. 76 Placing the burden on the party opposed to
such as statements of mental or physical condition not offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted (for example. "Bill is a dirty rat" offered to prove dislike for Bill) and
operative legal facts (for example, "I accept" offered to prove formation of a contract in
a jurisdiction employing the objective theory of contracts). MCCORMICK, supra note 16.
§ 288. Judge Learned Hand has criticized "res gestae" as "a phrase which has been ac-
countable for so much confusion that it had best be denied any place whatever in
legal terminology; if it means anything but an unwillingness to think at all, what it cov-
ers cannot be put in less intelligible terms." United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198
(2d Cir. 1944).
In eliminating the term from admissibility decisions, the Federal Rules have forced
attorneys to find justification for admissibility of a questioned statement under one of
the narrowly defined hearsay exceptions formerly encompassed by the term "res ges-
tae," and have also permitted reasoned appellate review of admissibility. Its removal
also increases the predictability of admissibility decisions because the more formal deci-
sionmaking requires analysis of clearly defined exceptions instead of reliance on a
vague catch-all.
73. The four principles considered here are not presented as an exhaustive list. They
merely exemplify the advantage of resort to underlying principles in deciding close
cases concerning admissibility of evidence.
74. J. THAYER, EVIDENCE 264-65 (1898).
75. FED. R. EvID. 402.
76. "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Con-
stitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority." Id. 402. See also id. 801
(defining nonverbal conduct as a "statement" subject to exclusion as hearsay only if it
was intended as an assertion). The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 801 provides:
When evidence of conduct is offered on the theory that it is not a statement, and
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admission thus provides a means of deciding close evidentiary ques-
tions. In close cases, any limiting policy or rule should be construed
narrowly and relevant evidence should be admitted unless the coun-
tervailing policy considerations are sufficiently strong.77
The Advisory Committee apparently regarded the principle of Rule
402 as a basic premise for the entire code.7 8 The principle that rele-
vant evidence should be admissible unless there is good ground for
exclusion influenced not only Rule 402; the principle was also a
major influence in the formulation of other rules of evidence. For ex-
ample, the many exceptions to the exclusionary hearsay rule reflect
the preference for admitting relevant evidence. In addition, the Advi-
sory Committee decided not to adopt a number of common law rules
which excluded evidence because it found the policy considerations
favoring exclusion to be insubstantial or unsubstantiated. 79
2. Probative value of relevant evidence is to be weighed against
the danger of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury
As a result of the bias in favor of admitting relevant evidence and
the lenient standard for determining relevancy,8 0 some method by
hence not hearsay, a preliminary determination will be required to determine
whether an assertion is intended. The rule is so worded as to place the burden upon
the party claiming that the intention existed; ambiguous and doubtful cases will be
resolved against him and in favor of admissibility.
Id. 80 1, Advisory Comm. Note, Subdivision (a).
77. E.g., Hopkins v. Baker, 553 F.2d 1339, 1344 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("all rele-
vant evidence should be admitted unless there is sound reason for excluding it"); United
States v. 1,129.75 Acres of Land, 473 F.2d 996, 999 (8th Cir. 1973) ('The law of evi-
dence in federal courts favors a broad rule of admissibility").
78. Succeeding rules in the present article, in response to the demands of particu-
lar policies, require the exclusion of evidence despite its relevancy. In addition,
Article V recognizes a number of privileges; Article VI imposes limitations upon
witnesses and the manner of dealing with them; Article VII specifies requirements
with respect to opinions and expert testimony; Article VIII excludes hearsay not
falling within an exception; Article IX spells out the handling of authentication and
identification; and Article X restricts the manner of proving the contents of writ-
ings and recordings.
FED. R. EVID. 402, Advisory Comm. Note.
79. See notes 52-65 and accompanying text supra (opinion on "ultimate issue"
may be admissible); notes 66-71 and accompanying text supra (expanded admissibility
for duplicates); notes 101-03 and accompanying text infra (new exceptions to the hear-
say rule); notes 121-23 and accompanying text infra (relaxation of authentication re-
quirements).
80. Rule 401 provides, "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the ac-
tion more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R.
EVID. 401.
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which the trial judge may exclude cumulative, misleading, or prejudi-
cial evidence is required by the interest in eliminating unduly long tri-
als and improperly based decisions and the interest in maintaining
confidence in the fairness of the system. Rule 403 provides a general
policy basis for such exclusion. 81 In addition, some evidence, al-
though relevant and not unfairly prejudicial, must be excluded for
policy reasons external to any individual case. Rules 404-411 deal
with several specific, frequently occurring situations requiring such
exclusion. 82
The specific rules provide for formal decisionmaking (as previously
defined83) in both senses: they are clearly defined within a code (as
opposed to case-by-case appellate court definition) and they severely
limit trial court discretion. Rule 403, on the other hand, provides for
the exclusion of any evidence, albeit relevant and not subject to an-
other more specific basis for exclusion, if admitting the evidence
would either waste time or promote a decision on an improper basis.
The number of times Rule 403 is cited as a check on abuses otherwise
possible under certain specific rules84 demonstrates that the drafters
of the Federal Rules intended it to operate as an underlying principle
to be considered in decisions under all other rules. Rule 403 allowed
the Advisory Committee to omit a number of rules and sections of
rules which would have excluded relevant, reliable evidence due to
the possibility of undue prejudice that exists in that general class of
81. Rule 403 provides, "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id. 403. For a thorough analysis of the
theoretical bases and practical application of Rule 403, see Dolan, Rule 403: The Preju-
dice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CALIF. L. REv. 220 (1976).
82. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 403 provides, "The rules which follow
in this Article are concrete applications evolved for particular situations. However, they
reflect [t] he policies underlying the present rule, which is designed as a guide for the
handling of situations for which no specific rules have been formulated." FED. R. EvID.
403, Advisory Comm. Note. The rules following Rule 403 thus deal with conduct or
statements with a very high probability for unduly prejudicing the jury, id. 404, 405
(character and "other crimes" evidence), and conduct or statements which have an inde-
pendent value to society that "substantially outweighs" their probative value, id. 407
(subsequent remedial measures); id. 408 (compromise and offers to compromise); id.
409 (payment of medical expenses); id. 410 (offers to plead guilty or nolo contendere);
and id. 411 (liability insurance).
83. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
84. E.g., FEo. R. EvID. 105, Advisory Comm. Note; id. 404, Advisory Comm. Note,
Subdivision (b); id. 407, Advisory Comm. Note; id. 608, Advisory Comm. Note. Subdi-
vision (b); id. 704, Advisory Comm. Note.
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evidence.85 At the same time, by specifically enumerating policies
vihich justify the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence, Rule
403 provides a basis for objection to opinion or. hearsay evidence that
is technically admissible under strict application of the rule or excep-
tion, but lacks the reliability or helpfulness which those rules were in-
tended to ensure.
3. The primary function of evidentiary rules is to ensure
trustworthiness of admissible evidence
In most instances, once evidence is found to be relevant and not
unduly prejudicial, its weight and trustworthiness are determinations
for the trier of fact. Nevertheless, given the primary objectives of rules
of evidence (avoidance of waste of time, decisions on improper bases,
and public distrust for the legal system), the overriding rationale for
further exclusionary rules must be the lack of trustworthiness of an of-
fered document, physical object, or statement. The Federal Rules and
the Advisory Committee's Notes repeatedly refer to trustworthiness in
defining hearsay exceptions, acceptable methods of authentication,
and provisions for greater admissibility of opinion and character evi-
dence.86 The result is a significant number of deletions, additions, or
amendments of common law rules to better effectuate the trustworthi-
ness rationale. In addition to the expanded admissibility of duplicates
under Rule 100387 and the enumeration of certain documents as self-
authenticating under Rule 902,88 the hearsay rule (with its excep-
tions) is an especially important example of deviation from the
85. Hence, the rule barring testimony expressing an opinion embracing the ulti-
mate issue was omitted despite the real danger of waste of time in some instances. FED.
R. EviD. 704. If the time wasted in a particular case would substantially outweigh the
probative value, Rule 403 provides for exclusion; otherwise, there is no valid basis for
excluding an opinion merely because it touches on the ultimate issue. See note 53 and
accompanying text supra.
86. E.g., FED. R. EviD. 803(24), 804(b)(5) (residual hearsay exceptions); id. 803,
Advisory Comm. Note ("The present rule proceeds upon the theory that under appro-
priate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial
even though he may be available."); id. 902, Advisory Comm. Note (evidence presumed
to be self-authenticating "because practical considerations reduce the possibility of
unauthenticity to a very small dimension"); id. 1003, Advisory Comm. Note (expanded
admissibility of duplicates because they are defined to be "the product of a method
which insures accuracy and genuineness").
87. See notes 66-70 and accompanying text supra.
88. See notes 121-23 and accompanying text infra.
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common law as a result of careful re-evaluation of the trustworthiness
of the various categories of hearsay.8 9 The emphasis that the authors
of the Federal Rules placed on trustworthiness is illustrated by the
way in which the Rules resolve a difficult hearsay question-whether
to admit or exclude evidence of nonassertive conduct.
Since hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, 90 courts were forced very early
on to determine whether and under what circumstances conduct
would be considered a statement. Clearly, conduct intended as the
equivalent of a verbal assertion (for example, shaking one's head in
answer to a question) is subject to all the hearsay dangers of an out-of-
court statement. The difficulty arises in classifying nonassertive con-
duct-conduct not intended to assert anything, or at least not in-
tended to assert the proposition for which it is offered at trial.9 ' A tra-
ditional example is the conduct of a ship captain in inspecting a ship
and then setting sail in it with her family. When such conduct is
offered as evidence of the seaworthiness of the ship, the conduct is
nonassertive because the ship captain did not inspect the boat and set
sail for the purpose of asserting its seaworthiness; we must infer the
captain's belief from her conduct.
At common law, nonassertive conduct was considered hearsay
when offered as proof of the inference derived from the conduct.92 As
Professor Edmund Morgan once stated:
If objective conduct is used to prove a state of mind, it is in fact
merely circumstantial evidence of an assertion which the actor is mak-
89. The astute attorney should understand and be prepared to argue the trustworthi-
ness (or lack thereof) of any item of potential hearsay, regardless of whether it techni-
cally fits within an enumerated exception. To do so, the attorney must understand the
basic objections to hearsay evidence (namely, inability to observe demeanor and lack of
oath and cross-examination) and the dangers sought to be avoided by generally exclud-
ing hearsay (namely inaccurate memory and perception and lack of sincerity). He can
then be prepared to argue the specific aspects of the particular offered hearsay which
overcome these objections and dangers. With respect to statements not covered by the
enumerated exceptions, this procedure is dictated by Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5). Deci-
sions involving borderline cases, possibly falling within an enumerated exception, and
proposed extensions or limitations of an enumerated exception should follow similar
guidelines.
90. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 801(C); McCORMICK, supra note 16, § 246.
91. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 801 explains conduct not intended to
assert the proposition for which it is offered as follows: "[N] onverbal conduct, however,
may be offered as evidence that the person acted as he did because of his belief in the ex-
istence of the condition sought to be proved, from which belief the existence of the con-
dition may be inferred." FED. R. EVID. 801, Advisory Comm. Note, Subdivision (a).
92. The classic case establishing nonassertive conduct as hearsay is Wright v. Doe d.
Tatham, 7 Ad. & El. 313, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (1837).
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ing in words or symbols to himself silently instead of in an audible so-
liloquy. Thus the proponent in such a case is offering the evidence for
a purpose which requires an assumption that the person whose con-
duct is offered had made to himself a statement, and is asking the trier
of fact to find the truth of the matter so stated.9 3
Under this reasoning, the ship captain silently asserted to herself that
the boat was seaworthy and, to the extent her conduct is offered at
trial to prove the truth of that assertion, it presents the hearsay dan-
gers of verbal assertions. It is unnecessary to join in the rather lengthy
and heated debate as to whether or not nonassertive conduct should
be classified as classic hearsay.94 The more pertinent question (and
the focus of the Advisory Committee 95) is whether there are alterna-
tive indicia of reliability sufficient to insure trustworthiness, despite
the absence of oath, demeanor, and cross-examination, so that nonas-
sertive conduct normally should be admissible.
Inaccurate memory is virtually never an issue with respect to non-
assertive conduct; the ship captain was in little danger of misremem-
bering the seaworthiness of the boat before setting sail. Further,
"[t] he situations giving rise to the nonverbal conduct are such as vir-
tually to eliminate questions of sincerity."96 Because there is by defi-
nition no intent to assert anything, there is small probability of fabri-
cation (purposeful deception). Also, the strength of the ship captain's
belief is indicated by the great risk taken in reliance on that belief,97
and the actor's belief in the truth of the inferred assertion-not the
truth of the assertion itself-is all that would be assured by in-court
testimony. Thus, when the assertion was unintended and when the
conduct from which the belief in the assertion is inferred involved risk
of loss to the actor, trustworthiness is assured and the basis for exclu-
sion as hearsay disappears.
93. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HIARV. L. REv. 177, 217 (1948). Professor Morgan subsequently abandoned this posi-
tion, urging instead that nonassertive conduct be excluded from operation of the hear-
say rule. Morgan, Hearsay, 25 Miss. L.J. 1, 8 (1953).
94. For a list of the major articles, see 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, 801(a)[01], at
801-47 n.5.
95. FED. R. EviD. 801, Advisory Comm. Note, Subdivision (a).
96. Id.
97. See Falknor, The "Hear-Say" Rule as a "See-Do" Rule, 33 ROCKY MT. L. REv.
133, 137 (1961). "[T] he absence of the danger of misrepresentation does work strongly
in favor of by-passing the hearsay objection, at least where the evidence of conduct is co-
gently probative. And it will be, where the action taken was important to the individual
in his own affairs .... Id.
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The very real dangers that the conduct involved insufficient risk or
was ambiguous and therefore unreliable absent cross-examination,
are obviated by Rules 104(a) and (b), 401, and 403. These rules re-
quire that before such evidence can be deemed admissible, the trial
judge must make a preliminary determination that the nonassertive
conduct is relevant and that its relevance is not outweighed by the
possibility of misleading the jury.98 Likewise, insufficient opportunity
for personal observation or knowledge of the matters which the con-
duct tends to establish would be a proper basis for exclusion in an in-
dividual case.99 Thus, if the ship captain's husband set sail but had
not inspected the ship, or was in a hurry and knew nothing of the
ship's safety, or had suicidal tendencies, the evidence of his conduct
should be excluded-not because it is hearsay, but because it is un-
trustworthy (lacks probative value sufficient to outweigh the risk of
unfair prejudice, confusion, or waste of time).
Nonassertive conduct is not the only aspect of the hearsay rule that
has been reconsidered in light of the emphasis on trustworthiness
rather than technical definition. Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) specifi-
cally permit admission into evidence of hearsay statements not within
any of the enumerated exceptions "but having equivalent circumstan-
tial guarantees of trustworthiness." 100 Also, requirements or limita-
tions contained in prior common law rules that do not significantly
98. FED. R. EVID. 104(a)-(b), 401, 403; see Falkner, supra note 97, at 138.
99. Professor John Maguire envisioned the procedure as follows:
Since hearsay on the whole is an inferior vehicle of communication, persuasive
argument can be offered for affirmative proof or perception by persons whose
behavior gives rise to [inferences relevant to the matter being proved]. Also, with
the purpose of protecting jurors from the misleading potentialities of purely
conjectural evidence, interlocutory findings by the trial judge may properly be
prerequisites for admission. It seems sufficiently cautious, however, to require nor-
mally only a judicial finding-embodied, if practicable, in pretrial proceedings-
that the individual with respect to whose behavior evidence is offered had adequate
opportunity for personal perception of the matters which the behavior tends to es-
tablish as having occurred or existed. Up to this point, the burden of preliminary
proof will naturally be on the proponent of the evidence. At some stage, though, his
primary obligation should end. If, for instance, the objecting party challenges the
normal consequences of opportunity by asserting neglect to observe or lack of
qualification to observe understandingly, it is suggested that the burden at least of
going forward with the unusual new issue can properly fall on the objector.
Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 74 1.
764 (1961) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
100. FED. R. EvIn. 803(24), 804(b)(5). See id. 803, Advisory Comm. Note (quoted
in note 86 supra). The residual hearsay exceptions were deleted from the Washington
Proposed Rules of Evidence. Washington Judicial Council, Minutes of the June 16,
1978 Meeting 12- 13 (on file at Washington Law Review).
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affect trustworthiness have been eliminated in the Federal Rules. Ex-
amples include defining a dying declaration as one during which the
declarant believed his death to be imminent, but not requiring that he
actually die,101 adding a present sense impression exception, 10 2 and
including declarations against penal interest in the declarations
against interest exception.103
4. For purposes of consistency and predictability,
like things should be treated alike
The principle that "like things should be treated alike" is funda-
mental to virtually all legal analysis and is equally applicable to the
law of evidence. Common law evidentiary decisions, however, were
often directed at only the category of evidence under consideration
and were made without an effort to promote consistency among the
various categories. As a result, evidence might be excluded in one trial
yet similar evidence might be admitted in another trial simply because
the latter evidence was, for some reason, placed in a different cate-
gory. Occasionally the differences were wholly semantic;10 4 at other
times, the decision whether to admit or exclude failed to take into ac-
count all relevant policy considerations, such as indicia of reliability
which might substitute for traditionally required conditions. 05 In
most instances, however, the failure to maintain consistency was due
to a mode of analysis that gave low priority to uniform application of
underlying rationales. The Federal Rules, by treating evidentiary
101. FED. R. EViD. 804(b)(2). See id. 804, Advisory Comm. Note, Subdivision (b),
Exception (3). The actual death of the declarant does not affect the reliability of the
statement since whatever reliability exists depends on sincerity in the face of imminent
death. Similarly, the need for the information arises whenever the declarant is unavail-
able, whether due to death or some other reason listed in Rule 804(a).
102. FED. R. EvID. 803(1). For an analysis of the greater reliability of such state-
ments over excited utterances, see Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the
Law of Evidence: Spontaneous Exclamations, 28 CoLuM. L. REv. 432 (1928).
103. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3). The Advisory Committee's Note explains:
The circumstantial guarantee of reliability for declarations against interest is the
assumption that persons do not make statements which are damaging to themselves
unless satisfied for good reason that they are true. ...
[El xposure to criminal liability satisfies the against-interest requirement.
The refusal of the common law to concede the adequacy of a penal interest was no
doubt indefensible in logic . ...
Id. 804, Advisory Comm. Note, Subdivision (b) Exception (4).
104. See Part IV- A supra.
105. See Part IV-B supra.
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rules as interrelated and the law of evidence as a unified whole, con-
stitute a conscious attempt to treat like things alike. Several examples
are discussed below.
As previously indicated, the Federal Rules have attempted to rede-
fine or eliminate rules that did not adequately effectuate the original
values (primarily trustworthiness) supporting them. A necessary by-
product of this process was that the rules became more consistent. For
example, if the basis for excepting declarations against pecuniary in-
terest from the hearsay exclusion is "the assumption that persons do
not make statements which are damaging to themselves unless satis-
fied for good reason that they are true,"106 then a statement subjecting
the declarant to a severe criminal penalty is at least as trustworthy and
should be as admissible as a statement subjecting her to pecuniary
loss. 10 7 And if statements of present sense impressions are as reliable
(and, in fact, may have fewer perception problems) 108 as excited utter-
ances, they should be equally admissible. 109 This principle is also evi-
dent, outside of the hearsay area, in the Federal Rules' provisions per-
mitting opinion as well as reputation character evidence, 110
permitting comparison by the trier of fact of authentic handwriting
exemplars with an offered disputed document,"1 and excluding evi-
106. FED. R. EvD. 804, Advisory Comm. Note, Subdivision (b), Exception (4).
107. Compare id. 804(b)(3) with Allen v. Dillard, 15 Wn. 2d 35. 129 P.2d 813
(1942). See also notes 45-46 and accompanying text ,upra.
108. See Hutchins & Slesinger, sutpra note 102.
109. See FED. R. EvID. 803(1). Prior to the Federal Rules, "'[flew courts [had] ac-
cepted a declaration explaining or describing an event or condition presently being per-
ceived by the declarant as an exception to the hearsay rule." Comment, Hearsay Under
the Proposed Federal Rules: A Discretionary Approach, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1077. 1115
(1969) (footnote omitted).
110. FED. R. EvID. 405(a), 608(a). The Advisory Committee's Note explains:
If character is defined as the kind of person one is, then account must be taken of
varying ways of arriving at the estimate. These may range from the opinion of the
employer who has found the man honest to the opinion of the psychiatrist based
upon examination and testing. No effective dividing line exists between character
and mental capacity, and the latter traditionally has been provable by opinion.
Id. 405, Advisory Comm. Note. Wigmore favored the use of opinion over "the second-
hand, irresponsible product of multiplied guesses and gossip which we term 'reputa-
tion.' '" 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1986, at 244 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). At least a wit-
ness's expression of personal opinion can be tested on cross-examination with respect to
its underlying bases. The reputation witness can be asked only what others have said
about the defendant-an unreliable and virtually untestable basis for determining char-
acter. Furthermore, the use of reputation but not personal opinion in proving character
opens the trial to the possibility of great abuse since a reputation witness may be asked
if he has heard about otherwise inadmissible (even nonexistent) instances of misconduct
by the defendant. This procedure, although not unconstitutional, has been criticized by
the Supreme Court. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 473-77 (1948).
11I. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3). The Advisory Committee's Note explains:
[TI he reservation to the judge of the question of the genuineness of exemplars and
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dence of payment of the opposing party's medical expenses as an ad-
mission of fault. 112 Given this emphasis on treating like things alike,
attorneys should be prepared to support or oppose admissibility of a
document or testimony by comparing it to categories of evidence
whose underlying rationales for admissibility can be applied to the ev-
idence under consideration. 1 3
C. Accommodation of Advances in Scientific or Socio-
Psychological Knowledge
As previously indicated, the Federal Rules have attempted to define
rules of evidence in terms of their underlying principles, with empha-
sis on trustworthiness and treating like things alike. Often, however,
the imposition of an unusually high standard of persuasion are at variance with the
general treatment of relevancy which depends upon fulfillment of a condition of
fact. Rule 104(b). No similar attitude is found in other comparison situations, e.g.,
ballistics comparison by the jury, [citation omitted] or by experts, [citation omit-
ted] and no reason appears for its continued existence in handwriting cases. Con-
sequently Example (3) sets no higher standard for handwriting specimens and
treats all comparison situations alike, to be governed by Rule 104(b).
Id. 901, Advisory Committee's Note, Subdivision (b), Example (3). Further, most juris-
dictions permit one "familiar" with the handwriting of the alleged author to identify a
disputed document. See MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 221. And yet,
[t] he infrequency of a lay witness's opportunity to acquire his knowledge of an-
other person's handwriting is immaterial as regards the admissibility of his testi-
mony. One observation (either of the act of writing or only of the writing itself)
satisfies the requirement of admissibility. Likewise, the proximity or remoteness of
such an opportunity or opportunities, in point of time to the occasion of his testi-
mony, does not affect the admissibility of the evidence.
Inbau, Lay Witness Identification of Handwriting, 34 ILL. L. REV. 433, 433-34 (1939)
(footnotes omitted).
It would seem that visual comparison by the jury of the exemplars and the disputed
handwriting would be at least as trustworthy as comparison from memory by a witness
who has seen the alleged author's handwriting once or twice, possibly many years previ-
ously.
112. FED. R. EVID. 409. Note that Rule 408 excludes statements made during offers
of compromise as well as the offers themselves. Although it is just as desirable to encour-
age payment of medical expenses occasioned by an injury (without necessarily
admitting fault) as offers of compromise, it may not be as necessary to the underlying
rationale (or to avoid a trap for the unwary) to exclude accompanying statements. The
Advisory Committee thus stated:
Contrary to Rule 408, dealing with offers of compromise, the present rule does
not extend to conduct or statements not a part of the act of furnishing or offering or
promising to pay. This difference in treatment arises from fundamental differences
in nature. Communication is essential if compromises are to be effected, and con-
sequently broad protection of statements is needed. This is not so in cases of pay-
ments or offers or promises to pay medical expenses, where factual statements may
be expected to be incidental in nature.
Id., Advisory Comm. Note. An obvious corollary to treating like things alike is that like
treatment ceases when dissimilarities relevant to policy objectives are found to exist.
113. See note 89 supra.
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our understanding of reliability and of similarities between categories
of evidence is increased by advances in scientific technology, psychol-
ogy, and sociology. Also, societal values vary over time and often
such changes should be reflected by changes in the rules of evidence
to avoid promoting outdated goals. The Federal Rules have ac-
counted for those advances known at the time of their enactment and
have provided for accommodation of future developments. The result
has been to ameliorate the "freezing" problem of formal decisionmak-
ing.114 Several examples of this receptivity to scientific advances fol-
low.
Recent technological advances in photocopying and electronic
recording have helped to make the strict common law rules governing
the admissibility of copies obsolete. The Federal Rules approach the
admissibility of copies by treating duplicates as originals whenever
they possess equivalent indicia of trustworthiness. Photocopies and
electronic recordings are generally as trustworthy as originals and
thus, in most situations, are equally admissible under Federal Rules
1001 and 1003.115 The Rules define "writings" and "recordings" to
include "typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, magnetic
impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other forms of data
compilation."' 1 6 Thus, the Federal Rules give specific guidance con-
cerning present methods of data compilation and also, along with the
Advisory Committee's Notes, provide for similar treatment of future
developments. 117 By explicitly recognizing that change will occur, the
Rules have attempted to obtain the advantages of formal decision-
making, but without the freezing problems normally associated with
formal rules.1 18
114. See note 44 supra.
115. Rule 1001(4) defines a "duplicate" as a "counterpart produced by the same im-
pression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography,
including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or
by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately repro-
duces the original." FED. R. EviD. 1001(4). Rule 1003 provides, "A duplicate is admissi-
ble to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the
authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the
duplicate in lieu of the original." Id. 1003.
116. Id. 1001(1). The Advisory Committee's Note provides, "Present day tech-
niques have expanded methods of storing data, yet the essential form which the informa-
tion ultimately assumes for usable purposes is words and figures. Hence the considera-
tions underlying the rule dictate its expansion to include computers, photographic
systems, and other modern developments." Id. 1001, Advisory Comm. Note, Paragraph
(I) (emphasis added).
117. Id.
118. See notes 33 & 44 supra.
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Likewise, an "original" is functionally defined, using several exam-
ples from photography and current computer technology, but also
anticipating future developments which relate to the underlying ra-
tionale for the rule.119 Finally, the definition and treatment of dupli-
cates12 0 reflect this accommodation of known scientific advances
coupled with guidance for treatment of future developments.
Authentication, like the hearsay and best evidence rules, is de-
signed to ensure that offered evidence is what it purports to be, is at
least minimally reliable, and is unlikely to mislead the fact finder.
Again, the rule is framed in general terms focusing on the underlying
rationale,' 2 ' followed by a number of specific illustrations.122 Wher-
ever appropriate, the Advisory Committee's Notes have clearly indi-
cated the intent to include modern practices and developments. Thus,
the Note to the federal rule concerning authentication of public rec-
ords or reports specifically extends authentication "by proof of
custody, without more.., to include data stored in computers and
similar methods, of which increasing use in the public records area
may be expected."'1 23
The Federal Rules have also enabled federal courts to analyze diffi-
cult admissibility issues, such as impeachment of a witness by means
119. Rule 1001(3) provides:
An "original" of a writing or recording is the writing or recording itself or any
counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. An
"original" of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. If data are
stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable by
sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an "original".
FED. R. EvID. 1001(3). The Advisory Committee's Note further indicates that "[w] hile
strictly speaking the original of a photograph might be thought to be only the negative,
practicality and common usage require that any print from the negative be regarded as
an original. Similarly, practicality and usage confer the status of original upon any
computer printout." Id., Advisory Comm. Note, Paragraph (3).
120. See notes 115-16 supra.
121. Rule 901(a) provides, "The requirement of authentication or identification as
a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." FED. R. EvID. 901(a).
122. Although ten illustrations are provided in Rule 901, "[t] he examples are not
intended as an exclusive enumeration of allowable methods but are meant to guide and
suggest, leaving room for growth and development in this area of the law." Id. 901, Ad-
visory Comm. Note, Subdivision (b).
123. Id., Example (7) (citations omitted). The Advisory Committee's Note also in-
dicates that the rule concerning authentication of ancient documents was extended to
include data stored electronically due to "the widespread use of methods of storing data
in forms other than conventional written records." Id., Example (8). Furthermore, the
Note accompanying Rule 901(b)(9) (authenticating "a process or system used to pro-
duce a result") makes reference to computers and X-rays. Id., Example (9).
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of psychiatric testimony 124 or lie detector results. 125 The utilization of
modern scientific and psychological techniques to produce and evalu-
ate evidence, when coupled with adequate reliability safeguards, is es-
sential to a rational code of evidence. 126 It is anticipated that use of
such techniques will greatly increase under the Federal Rules.
V. CONCLUSION
Until now, this article has extolled the virtues of the Federal Rules
of Evidence as a rational, comprehensive, progressive codification of
the law of evidence. The obvious implication is that Washington
should adopt the Proposed Washington Rules of Evidence that were
taken, with very few alterations, from the Federal Rules. The Wash-
ington Judicial Council's Proposed Rules pamphlet,1 27 however, lists
a number of deviations from the Federal Rules,1 28 despite the recogni-
tion "that substantial uniformity of the state and federal rules would
make it easier for counsel to try cases in both judicial systems, and...
that departures should not be made from the federal version unless
there were substantial reasons for the departure."1 29
Although a detailed analysis of the proposed departures is beyond
the scope of this article, it should be noted that several of the federal
rules analyzed herein as examples of useful and well-reasoned ad-
vances over their common law counterparts, have been modified or
deleted from the Washington Proposed Rules. 30 In addition, the fed-
124. 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 2, 607 [04], at 607-40 to 607-49.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510 (D. Md. 1973) (admissibil-
ity of polygraph evidence, citing Proposed Federal Rules); United States v. Ridling, 350
F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (polygraph evidence admissible in perjury prosecution in
conjunction with testimony by court-appointed expert, relying on Proposed Federal
Rules).
126. Wigmore has stated, "If courts will open their minds to the realization that sci-
ence can be applied to the judgment of testimonial credit, regardless of rules arising be-
fore the days of modern science, they will readily follow a liberal practice." 3 J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 990, at 626 (3d ed. 1940). See Weihofen, Testimonial Competence
and Credibility, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 53, 68 (1965) ("the law should be flexible
enough to make use of new resources").
127. PROPOSED WASH. R. EVID. (1977) (drafted and approved by Washington Judi-
cial Council).
128. Id. at xv.
129. Id. at xiv.
130. The following rules have been altered or deleted by the Judicial Council. Rules
405 and 608 were changed so as not to permit proof of character by testimony in the
form of an opinion. PROPOSED WASH. R. EVID. 405, 608. See note 110 and accompany-
ing text supra. The residual hearsay exceptions, although included in the Proposed
Rules, id. 803(24), 804(b)(5), were subsequently deleted by vote of the Washington Judi-
cial Council. Washington Judicial Council, Minutes of the June 16, 1978 Meeting 12-
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eral rule concerning the use of prior convictions to impeach criminal
defendants, the departure from the federal rule concerning admissions
by agents, and the failure to re-evaluate and codify state rules regard-
ing privilege are analyzed elsewhere in this volume of Washington
Law Review. 131 Where deviations from the Federal Rules undermine
the principles that rules should be based on underlying ratio-
nales (with emphasis on trustworthiness) rather than on semantics and
that rationally equivalent categories should be treated uniformly, it is
suggested that the Washington Supreme Court adopt the federal,
rather than the proposed Washington rule.
Regardless of the dysfunctional amendments and deletions pro-
posed by the Judicial Council, the Proposed Washington Rules are
sufficiently similar to the Federal Rules to promote the underlying
bases for establishing any rules of evidence and to resolve as effec-
tively as possible the two "unavoidable conflicts" addressed in Part III
of this article.' 32 Both codifications enhance formal decisionmaking,
with its concomitant uniformity and predictability, by affording
guidance to appellate and trial courts and by eliminating rulemaking
on a case-by-case basis. They also promote uniformity and predicta-
bility by providing illustrations and examples of the proper applica-
tion of specific rules. Additional explanations and examples are pro-
vided in the Advisory Committee's Note to each rule. Wherever an
overly narrow definition of a rule might cause decisions based on
semantic distinctions, the Rules are defined in terms of their guiding
principles or policies and therefore permit some measure of predicta-
bility and meaningful review in close cases.
On the other hand, emphasis on nonformal decisionmaking is ap-
parent in those rules providing for extensive trial court discretion in
13 (on file with Washington Law Review). See note 41; note 100 and accompanying text
supra. Rule 901 was altered to provide that the court, rather than the jury, may initially
determine the authenticity of a document by comparison with a document of known
authenticity. PROPOSED WASH. R. EVID. 901. See note Ill and accompanying text supra.
131. Comment, The Marital Privileges in Washington Law: Spouse Testimony and
Marital Communications, 54 WASH. L. REV. 65 (1978) (this volume) (privilege); Com-
ment, Elimination of the Agency Fiction in the Vicarious Admissions Exception, 54
WASH. L. REV. 97 (1978) (this volume) (admissions by agents); Comment, Proposed
Rule of Evidence 609: Impeachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior Convictions, 54
WASH. L. REV. 117 (1978) (this volume) (impeachment by prior conviction).
132. With respect to the conflict between faith in and fear of the jury, Rules 103 and
104 define and distinguish the roles of judge and jury. PROPOSED WASH. R. EvID. 103,
104. Also, since the Rules make use of explicitly enunciated rationales rather than
semantics, and emphasize admissibility except when evidence is unreliable or mislead-
ing, they provide guidance as to what evidence should be kept from the jury.
Washington Law Review Vol. 54:31, 1978
the major areas of relevancy, hearsay, and opinion testimony. Non-
formal decisionmaking is also promoted by language which permits
recognition and accommodation of future developments in science,
technology, sociology, and psychology.
The result is a carefully drafted code that provides substantial guid-
ance to trial judges (and uniformity and reviewability to their deci-
sions) regarding admissibility, yet permits discretion to modify the
rules in particular cases if the modification is supported by several
policy considerations clearly enunciated throughout the code. Wash-
ington's adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence-even with, but
particularly without, the modifications suggested by the Judicial
Council-would constitute a significant modernization and clarifica-
tion of the law of evidence in Washington.
